In a very preliminary way, the pluralistic perspectives on logic are based on the idea that there is more than one correct, true, or adequate logic. This means that there is more than one way to say which arguments are logically valid and which logical principles hold. In this talk, I offer an overview of the current scenario on this topic. The first step is to motivate logical pluralism by giving its context and how it contributes to our present debate on philosophy of logic, for instance, what are the scope and limitations of classical logic, how to deal with paradoxes and weird operations like material implication and so on. The second step is to search for a definition of pluralism, which mostly requires a discussion of the notions of logical consequence and validity. Depending on how it is done, we will see that there are many ways one can be a pluralist about logic, be it by cases, contexts, domains, inferential practices, etc. Finally, we need to clarify how only some logics, and not all of them, get to be legit, that is, how can we avoid a trivial theory and how logical relativism fits here. In order to do so, I will present a brief characterization of these approaches.