The so-called Maverick Turn in the Philosophy of Mathematics has been marked by an increasing focus on the mathematical practice. One pressuposition, found in many maverick authors as Lakatos (1976), Kitcher (1984), Hersh (1997), Ernest (1998) and Cole (2013), is that taking the practice at face value incline us to reject any realist explanation for mathematical objects, or even for mathematical truth. As they mostly argued, any reasonable account of the practice is incompatible with theories that explains mathematics in aprioristic terms. In this talk, I want to evaluate this pressuposition in the following twofold manner: first, by showing that some of the realist features are actually pressuposed in the practice, and second, that authors that seek to explain mathematics aprioristically were not completely blind to the practice. The paradigmatic case will be Frege: the realist spokesman and common target of the mavericks.