The standard interpretation of Frege's logic (the van Heijenoort-Dreben reading) states that his conception is universal and devoided of a metatheory. My plan is to discuss this view in the light of Frege's philosophical heritage. I'll focus on two points. First, his universalist conception can be readed as a transcendental perspective about logic. In this case, the idea of a metatheory is nonsensical. Second, following the tradition, Frege still employs illocutions in logic, specifically Assertions, to deal with the absence of the truth-predicate. Both points made Frege's logic more philosophical than mathematical, but none would survive the subsequent developments of logic. The birth of the metatheory saw the downfall of such universalist conception, and the abandonment of the use of Assertions. My conclusion is that Frege's actual influence in the history of Logic was only local, but not general: logic is not, and never was, truly fregean.