On the De-Pragmatization of Logic

My goal is to assess the evolution of logical formalism that saw, especially in the first half of the twentieth century, a shift from a logic-as-practice to a logic-as-object perspective, a process that I will call logical de-pragmatization. I will claim that this shift is the product of a long historical process of reform that saw the abandonment of Judgements and the systematization of some primitive notions with modern meta-theoretic perspective, such as Hilbert's formalization of Proof and Tarski's semantic conception of Truth. The nineteenth-century dispute over Psychologism also played a significant role in de-pragmatizing logic, as I will argue. Albeit a decisive moment in the history of logic, I will conclude provisionally that the de-pragmatization was never fully reached in most formalisms. Even in current standards, the adoption of performative components is an inescapable fact in logical and mathematical practice.